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Abstract  
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government abolished the Discretionary Social 
Fund and Council Tax Benefit in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 as part their programme of 
austerity, with powers to design replacement schemes devolved to local authorities in England. 
Discretionary Housing Payments, which had long been the responsibility of local authorities, were 
given an expanded role – to soften the edges of welfare reform being pursued by central 
government. This paper presents analysis of a new quantitative dataset constructed by the author 
detailing variations in these three payments across local authorities in England. This analysis 
explores the variation in provision that now exists across England and examines the extent to 
which the political makeup of elected councils, as well as economic and demographic differences, 
can explain the variations in provision that now exist. We find that there has been substantial 
retrenchment in the local social security schemes in the period since their localisation, indicating 
that the devolution of powers alongside budget cuts has proved a successful mechanism for 
implementing austerity. We also find that the political makeup of elected councils is associated 
with the degree of cutbacks in these schemes, with Labour-led councils less likely to retrench 
across all three payments when compared with councils led by the Conservative party, suggesting 
that politics remains possible even in a harsh financial climate such as those faced by local 
authorities in England. 
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The imposition of austerity in the UK since 2010 by Conservative-led governments has resulted 
in spatially unequal outcomes and has hit those in poverty hard. Local government has borne the 
brunt of particularly severe cuts (Gray and Barford, 2018). To date, the literature on the spatial 
impact of cuts to social security during this period of austerity has largely focussed on cuts to 
national payments (e.g. Beatty and Fothergill, 2016; 2018), the impact of which has been felt 
unequally across the UK. But the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government also 
created a new spatial dimension in relation to social security provision through changes to three 
schemes, which we label collectively as ‘local social security schemes’ in this paper.  
The Welfare Reform Act of 2012 abolished two schemes – Council Tax Benefit and the 
Discretionary Social Fund – and tasked local authorities in Englandi with designing local 
replacements. Council Tax Benefit was a centrally-designed but locally-administered scheme, while 
the Discretionary Social Fund, as its name implies, was based on localised discretion, but the 
administration of the scheme had been ‘centralised to 20 Benefit Delivery Centres (BDCs) under 
previous Labour governments’, which the Conservatives viewed as impeding the discretionary 
nature of the scheme (Grover, 2012: 355). A third scheme, Discretionary Housing Payments, 
which are top-up payments made by local authorities to help residents meet rent payments, were 
given an expanded remit to include the mitigation of (some of) the effects of welfare reform. 
These local welfare schemes were argued by government to soften the edges of cuts made to 
national social security payments. In a debate in the House of Commons in March 2013, the 
Labour MP Stephen Timms asked about a disabled woman whose council-owned home had been 
adapted at public expense but who, with the introduction bedroom tax, was faced with the 
prospect of being forced to move. In response, the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
Iain Duncan Smith, replied:  
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that that is the point of discretionary housing 
payments…we have put more money into discretionary payments to sort these things out than they 
ever did when they brought these in. The reality is that there is money for them to do just that.1  
When pressed by Labour MP Kate Green about pressures on the Local Welfare Assistance 






Communities and Local Government (and Conservative MP) Brandon Lewis, spoke to the 
supposed efficiency of these schemes, suggesting that:  
‘The hon. Lady is right; local authorities are running a range of really good schemes. That is why they 
have been passed to local authorities. What has been highlighted is that many authorities are running 
good, efficient schemes and spending way below the amount of money originally put forward.2 
These are far-from-unique exchanges. When faced with criticism about cuts to national schemes 
made in the period since 2010, government figures have on many occasions pointed to the new 
emphasis on local authority provision. The localisation of these schemes opened up the prospect 
of a new spatial terrain of social security support across England. And yet, we know relatively little 
about the extent to which a variable patchwork of provision has in fact emerged, due in part to 
the limited reporting requirements placed on local authorities in relation to the design of, and the 
financial allocations made to, these schemes. This matters because these schemes are significant 
for people living on the lowest incomes and because the devolution of powers in the context of 
fiscal consolidation is a neglected aspect of the governance of austerity.  
 
The aims of this paper are twofold: to examine variations in these three payments since their 
‘localisation’ in April 2013, and to explore whether the political makeup of elected councils can 
help to explain this variation. To do this, we present analysis from a new dataset compiled by the 
author, consisting of publicly-available information as well as data collated from two Freedom of 
Information (FOI) requests by Church Action on Poverty and the New Policy Institute, which 
they have very kindly shared. This new dataset enables examination of variation in relation to these 
three payments jointly for the first time.  
In the next section, we provide a discussion of relevant literature on welfare state change that has 
informed the present study and outline our hypotheses. In the third section we describe the three 
local schemes in question and discuss what we know about what has happened these schemes 
since their localisation in April 2013. We then outline, in the fourth section, the data and methods, 
in which we describe the dataset that has been constructed and the variables that it contains. The 
fifth section contains the empirical analysis and this is presented for the three payments in turn, 








Austerity, localism and welfare politics 
This study draws on the literature on welfare state change in seeking to understand our empirical 
case of the localisation of three payments following the Welfare Reform Act 2012. In this tradition, 
there is long-standing debate about whether in the supposed “era of austerity” we observe large-
scale retrenchment or whether policies prove resilient to attempts to dismantle them (e.g. Pierson, 
1994; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013). These debates are located primarily at national 
rather than local level. The contribution here is in terms of providing an examination of 
partisanship in the context of new (constrained) cases, as we explain below. In doing so, we aim 
not only to shed light on these important cases, but also on one of the neglected aspects of the 
programme of welfare reform that has been implemented in the period since 2010. 
This debate acts as a starting point for thinking about the three local welfare schemes considered 
here, but the context in which these schemes have emerged differs in notable respect from that of 
the wider debate. First, the passage of the Welfare Reform Act is treated not as a variable but as a 
known fact – the puzzle is what the localisation provisions within the Act have meant for the 
policies enacted at local level. Second, the resilience perspective faces significant challenge in this 
context since local government finances are heavily dependent on grants received from central 
government. With these grants constrained significantly in the period in question one could argue 
that the localisation of these payments is an example of ‘responsibility without (effective) power’ 
(Brien, 2018: 6). An NAO report from 2018 finds that ‘spending power’ (central government 
funding plus council tax receipts) fell by 28.7% in real terms between 2010/11 and 2017/18, with 
rising Council Tax partially offsetting deep cuts to central government grants (NAO, 2018: 15).  
Third, even within the new institutionalist school of thought, which has tended to emphasise the 
political difficulty of imposing austerity, the path dependent nature of institutions and the resilience 
this implies, there is a recognition that there are conditions that make the successful 
implementation of austerity more likely. Each of Pierson’s (1994: 19-24) three strategies for 
minimising resistance to retrenchment can be seen in relation to the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
The first, obfuscation, can be observed in terms of the minimal reporting requirements placed on 
local authorities following the localisation of two payments (CTB and LWA), which has ensured 
that the consequences of localisation have minimal visibility. The second, division, might be seen 
in terms of the demand that pensioners be protected in the local CTB schemes that were designed, 
thereby concentrating losses on working-age residents. The third, compensation, applies to the 
Welfare Reform Act more broadly, where the increase in funding for Discretionary Housing 
Payments was used to offset losses for some claimants, providing both a real (yet limited) and 
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rhetorical response to the critics of austerity. This context, then, suggests that widespread austerity 
is likely to have been the effect of localising these schemes. 
There is then the question of how variations in provision can be explained. This matters because 
a key concern of any localisation process is that it creates policy variations between areas which 
raise questions of justice between citizens (Chaney, 2013). To consider this, we draw on work 
suggesting the importance of partisan politics for explaining variations in social provision. In The 
Possibility of Politics, Stein Ringen (1987: 205; see also Korpi, 1983) argued that ‘it is possible to effect 
change via social reform, and secondly, that the harder we try the more impact we may expect to 
have’. However, this work, and the literature on partisanship more broadly, is almost exclusively 
based at the level of the nation-state, where welfare politics are primarily located. One reason why 
we might not expect this dynamic to be similarly apparent in relation to these localised schemes is 
that local government finance is determined to a considerable extent by central government, which 
limits the extent to which partisan ideology can translate into policy variation. Local authorities of 
all hues are operating within a restrictive financial climate, forcing them to make difficult choices 
in terms of which services to prioritise and which to cut. Given this, two other types of variation 
we might expect to observe are in relation to the needs and wealth of the local authorities in 
question: that is, we expect that local authorities with greater demographic challenges and with 
greater competition for resources will be more likely to have responded to this new localism by 
imposing cuts to these three schemes. 
These theoretical traditions inform our three hypotheses: 
• Political: Faced with equivalent problems in terms of the need to square service and 
scheme provision within a given, and constrained, resource envelope, authorities of 
different political hues will make distinct – and predictable – choices. In particular, this 
hypothesis predicts that Conservative-led councils will be more likely to retrench local 
welfare schemes than Labour-led administrations. 
• Demographic: LAs with higher age-dependency ratios face greater financial challenges 
and will cut back on local social security provision for working-age residents to a greater 
extent than authorities whose residents are predominantly younger. This is in part because, 
faced with greater demand in areas of statutory responsibility (e.g. adult and child social 
care), local authorities will have little choice but to make cuts on discretionary spending 
items such as the local social security schemes; 
• Economic: Resource competition is greater in more deprived authorities, and therefore 
increases the pressure to retrench local social security provision in these authorities. This 
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can be because of lower capacity to raise revenue (e.g. via Council Tax or Business Rates, 
half of which are retained by local authorities) as well as greater demand on locally provided 
services and schemes, including the local social security schemes.  
It is to the three payments that make up this local social security provision that we now turn. 
The three local welfare schemes and what became of them 
The first of the three policies we examine are Local Welfare Assistance schemes, which replaced 
some of the discretionary elements of the Social Fund following the Welfare Reform Act of 2012. 
The Social Fund was made up of two components – a regulated scheme and a discretionary 
scheme. The regulated scheme provided ‘maternity, funeral, cold weather and winter fuel payments 
for people who satisfy certain qualifying conditions’ (DWP, 2018: 6). The discretionary scheme, as 
its name implied, provided no right to an award, even where qualifying conditions were met, and 
budgets were cash limited. Grover (2012: 354) notes that ‘the discretionary elements of the Social 
Fund were introduced as part of the Social Security Act 1986 as a means of relieving the 
“exceptional expenses” of the poorest social assistance recipients’. These payments acted as a 
‘scheme of last resort’ for those unable to meet unexpected short-term expenditures – in Royston’s 
words ‘to give aid in a crisis’ (2017: 240). 
From April 2013, upper-tier local authorities were given the responsibility of designing and 
administering replacement schemes. Central government would provide local authorities with 
funding for these new schemes, but at national level there were major cuts in the aggregate budget 
from about £330m in 2010/11 to £178m in 2013/14 (Royston, 2017: 242), the point of their 
localisation. From 2015/16, the funding for Local Welfare Assistance schemes was amalgamated 
into the Revenue Support Grant received by councils (Gibbons, 2017: 5), rather than remaining a 
distinct budget item. 
The Coalition government sought to emphasise the link between the localisation of this support 
and an enhanced ability to respond to local need, arguing ‘that local knowledge is best suited for 
the relief of “exceptional needs”’ (DWP, 2011: 7 cited in Grover, 2012: 356). Grover (2012: 356) 
continues, ‘in this sense, LWA is framed by a concern with the imperfect knowledge of central 
government that, as we have seen, is crucial to the localism critique of central government 
functions’. Inevitably, the capacity of such schemes to respond to local need is bound up with the 
financial allocations to such schemes. Even if locally designed schemes were more efficient in terms 
of targeting a given set of resources at areas of greater local need, dramatic cuts to the budgets of 
such schemes cannot but reduce their potential to do so (see also Hick and Lanau, 2019). 
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Importantly, there were no requirements placed on upper-tier authorities in terms of the design of 
their Local Welfare Assistance schemes, even in the most minimal of senses in terms of requiring 
that such schemes must remain open. Moreover there were no requirements placed on authorities 
to report to central government on the design of, or the financial allocations to, the schemes that 
they implemented (Ayrton et al., 2019: 32). Drakeford and Davidson (2013) argue the devolution 
of LWA to local authorities in England displayed ‘an overall drive to avoid any central 
responsibility for future policy decision-making’, resulting in high levels of local authority 
discretion in terms of the policies that they would pursue. 
The second scheme are Council Tax Support schemes, which replaced the previous Council Tax 
Benefit in 2013, again as a result of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. Under the Council Tax Benefit 
system, means-tested social security claimants would automatically be entitled to full support for 
Council Tax via ‘passporting’, with claimants of other payments applying on a means-tested basis 
(Royston, 2017: 88). Council Tax Benefit/Support is not a cash benefit but is rather a waiver on 
otherwise liable Council Tax payments, and is thus significant from the point of view of the 
Council as it impacts on the revenue that Councils receive.  
Following the Welfare Reform Act, Council Tax Support schemes were, similarly, devolved to LAs 
in England with a 10% cut in their budget. The devolution of this benefit along with a cut left, in 
the words of Hastings and colleagues (2017: 2021) ‘”few alternatives” but to download austerity 
to the poor’. Unlike the Local Welfare Assistance schemes, central government mandated that 
pensioners be protected from any cuts within in these locally-designed Council Tax Support 
schemes. The devolution of the scheme in conjunction with a budget cut, when combined with a 
requirement to protect pensioners, meant that local authorities would be pushed towards making 
savings from working-age residents, especially in authorities with higher proportion of pensioner 
households (Royston, 2017: 243).  
The third schemes are Discretionary Housing Payments. These are local authority-provided 
payments made to recipients of Housing Benefit, or of the housing element of Universal Credit, 
to enable them to make rent payments. They are regular, rather than one-off, payments, though 
they are typically time-limited. They are of an older provenance than the 2012 Welfare Reform 
Act, but they have taken on a new importance in softening the edges of welfare reform (Meers, 
2019), with central government allocations to local authorities determined in part by estimates of 
the impact of the Benefit Cap, the Bedroom Tax and changes to Local Housing Allowance at LA 
level. Reflecting this newfound role, the total allocation to DHPs increased from £20m in 2010/11 
to £130m in 2013/14 (Royston, 2017: 236-237) as local authorities were provided with funding to 
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offset some losses in relation to welfare reform. The total central government allocation in 
2018/19 was £153m. 
While DHP funding is provided by central government, local authorities are permitted to top-up 
their award and to spend a maximum of two and a half times the central government allocation. 
Ayrton et al. (2019: 31) suggest that ‘significant over-spending relative to the funds provided by 
central government is taken as evidence that a borough is forming its own view of local need’. On 
the other hand, authorities are not required to spend the allocations they receive. Given the 
importance of DHPs in preventing families from becoming homeless, Meer (2019) argues that ‘it 
is perhaps surprising, therefore, that not all local authorities spend the entirety of their DHP 
budgets; 33% of authorities spend less than 95% of their DWP allocation (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2018)’.  
 
Much of what we know about what has happened these schemes since their localisation has come 
from a number of think-tanks and third-sector organisations (e.g. Aitchison, 2018; Ayrton et al., 
2019), who have sought to investigate the extent of provision some years after the devolution of 
powers to local authorities. These existing works paint a picture of substantial retrenchment in 
local social security provision in the period since localisation in April 2013. Adam et al. (2019) find 
that, by 2018-19, 90% of English councils had made changes to their CTS scheme, which they 
note is up from 82% in 2013/14. Ayrton (2016) shows that the most common change made by 
LAs to their Council Tax Support schemes was to introduce ‘minimum payments’ – that is, a 
minimum amount of Council Tax that a household would have to pay irrespective of their income. 
But other approaches were adopted too, including amending taper rates that govern the extent to 
which eligibility is withdrawn as income increases, restricting eligibility via reducing the threshold 
of savings people are allowed before eligibility is withdrawn, and by introducing ‘band caps’, which 
prevents eligibility for residents in higher Council Tax-band properties (Royston, 2017; Ayrton et 
al., 2019).  
We also know that Local Welfare Assistance schemes have, in many places, been cut back or even 
closed. Gibbons (2017: 18) notes: ‘Reviewing the websites of all English upper-tier local authorities 
as at the end of April 2017, we find that twenty six (16 percent of the total) of these have now 
closed their local welfare schemes’, and that ‘a further 40 local authorities have set a budget for 
local welfare provision which is at least 60 percent lower than their initial 2013/14 allocations from 
DWP, excluding administration costs’. Research by Church Action on Poverty finds that the 
aggregate amount spent on Local Welfare schemes has declined from £172m, provided by central 
government to English local authorities in 2013/14, to an estimated £46.4m provided for by 
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English local authorities in 2017/18 (Aichison, 2018: 4). Variations in Discretionary Housing 
Payments have not attracted the same degree of attention but are of interest for the reasons 
discussed above.  
While we have some understanding of how these schemes have changed over time, we have less 
information about which kinds of authorities have cut their schemes back. An exception to this is 
by Adam et al. (2019), who find that, after adjusting for local authority differences, Labour-led 
councils were less likely to have imposed minimum Council Tax Payments than those led by the 
Conservative party. These findings, however, related to only one of the three schemes considered 
here. This paper is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first attempt to bring together 
empirical data on the three schemes jointly in the period since localisation. 
Data and Methods 
The analysis presented in this paper has been facilitated by the compilation of a new dataset. It is 
the first time, to the author’s knowledge, that this data on the three local welfare schemes have 
been analysed jointly. Data in relation to the Local Welfare Assistance schemes has kindly been 
shared by Church Action on Poverty. In 2018, Church Action on Poverty issued FOI requests to 
163 local authorities to provide information about their Local Welfare Assistance schemes 
(Aitchison, 2018). There are 151 upper-tier and unitary authorities in England, but in a small 
number of cases upper-tier authorities have themselves devolved responsibility and budget for 
LWA schemes to district councils so there are a slightly larger number of relevant authorities. Our 
data on Local Welfare Assistance schemes includes a binary measure of whether an LWA scheme 
remained open in 2018/19 for 151 of the 163 authorities who were asked to provide information 
on this, and a measure capturing the percentage change in the LWA budget – comparing the amount 
council’s received in 2013/14 from central government to provide initial funding to the scheme to 
the financial allocations councils had set for the financial year 2018/19 – for 129 authorities. 
In relation to Council Tax Benefit, we draw on data which has been collected through FOI requests 
by the New Policy Institute and kindly shared by them. There are a number of ways that councils 
can change their CTS schemes. As Ayrton (2016) notes, by far the most common amendment 
made has been to introduce minimum payments for working-age claimants, and we include this 
variable here. Another way that CTS schemes can be amended is by introducing band caps, as 
discussed above, and we include this as a secondary measure in our sensitivity analysis. Our analysis 
for this policy measures is based on data for 322 of the 326 lower-tier or unitary councils. 
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In relation to Discretionary Housing Payments, data on financial returns at local authority level are 
provided by central government on a bi-annual basis (UK Government, n.d.). This provides us 
with data for six financial years between 2013/14 and 2018/19. In 2018/19 £153 million was 
allocated to local authorities for the purpose of Discretionary Housing Payments. Two thirds of 
DHP allocations are itemised as partially offsetting specific aspects of welfare reform (in 
descending order of size, on the Bedroom Tax/Spare Room Subsidy, the Benefit Cap, LHA 
allowance reforms and a combination of changes in these payments). The remaining one-third is 
not identified as not relating to welfare reform per se. Central government provide local authority-
level data about the amounts spent on DHP during the financial year and the allocations from 
central government made to local authorities for this purpose. From this we construct a measure 
of the proportion of their central government DHP allocation that authorities spend, averaged 
over the six years for which we have data. We have data for 313 of the 326 lower-tier or unitary 
councils for this measure. 
In terms of independent variables, the political makeup of elected Councils across England are 
drawn from the database compiled by Keith Edkins on this topic.ii Our primary political variable 
is the part of control of elected councils in England. This is based on composition data following 
the local elections held on 2 May 2018, a period which thus corresponds to the most recent period 
of interest in terms of the policy variables.  
Our demographic variable, the age dependency ratio, captures the proportion of residents of 60 
years or above as a proportion of those aged between 16 and 59 in each local authority. We rely 
on two economic measures. The first is a measure of Gross Value Added by local authority, data 
for which is available form the Office for National Statistics. GVA captures ‘value added by 
production activity in a region to the resident population of that region’ (ONS, n.d.). The most 
recent year for which we have data is 2015, which is the year analysed here. There are a small 
number of extreme values in this data so we top-code the original variable at £50,000 (which 
affects seven cases) and express values in thousands. Our second measure is quantiles of the 2015 
Index of Multiple Deprivation, which have been aggregated up from Lower Super Output Area 
(LSOA) to local authority (LA) level. The IMD is a multidimensional composite indicator based 
on the dimensions of income, employment, education, health, crime, housing and living 
environment (DCLG, 2015). The dataset contains both the composite measure and its component 
dimensions. Our primary measure of deprivation captures the average of multidimensional 
deprivation scores of LSOAs within a local authority. Our analysis is based on IMD deprivation 
deciles for the analysis of Council Tax Support and Discretionary Housing Payments; the analysis 
of Local Welfare Assistance is based on a smaller sample of unitary and upper-tier councils; we 
11 
 
therefore rely on IMD deprivation quintiles. In the sensitivity analysis we also focus on the income 
and employment subcomponents. Finally, in one model we include a dummy for councils in 
London and the South East, where cost pressures are especially acute, and for another model we 
include a control for Housing Benefit receipt (in 2015), data for which has been taken from the 
DWP’s StatsXplore site.  
The analytic strategy is to present descriptive information about what has happened to each 
scheme since the period of localisation, and then to move towards regression models in which we 
examine the effect of partisans makeup of elected councils, while controlling for economic and 
demographic differences. The analysis relies on Ordinary Least Squares regression which is 
appropriate since the dependent variables are continuous and do not depart excessively from 
normality. We include stars indicating statistical significance in the regression tables, though of 
course we are dealing with a near-census of local authorities and thus the logic underpinning 
statistical significance does not apply. For this reason, we concentrate our attention on effect sizes 
in discussing the results. In the penultimate section we summarise the key points form the 
sensitivity analysis that has been conducted, which includes models with additional controls, 
alternative operationalisation of key variables and non-linear model specification. 
Analysis  
Local Welfare Assistance schemes 
We begin our analysis with the Local Welfare Assistance schemes, the data for which have been 
collated and kindly shared by Church Action on Poverty. There are two variables of interest in 
relation to these schemes – a binary measure indicating whether these schemes remained open 
and, for authorities where the scheme remains open, how the budget has changed in the period 
2013/14 to 2018/19. Table 1 demonstrates that, by 2018/19, 83 per cent of local authorities have 









Table 1. Does the Local Welfare Scheme remain open? 
 
Turning then to how the scheme budgets have changed over time,3 in Table 2 we observe that the 
median change to the budget was a cut of more than three-quarters, and more than eight in ten 
have cut their schemes by one-half. Thus, while most schemes remain open, the budgets for these 
schemes have typically been severly curtailed. 
Table 2. Change in LWA budget between 2013/14 and 2018/19 
 
In Table 3 below, we explore the association between Party of Control and whether the Local 
Welfare Assistance scheme remains open. Table 3 is consistent with the partisanship hypothesis, 
with Labour-led Councils more likely than Conservative administrations to have kept their LWA 
schemes open. Three-quarters of Conservative-led councils have kept their schemes open, 
compared with 90% of Councils that are led by majority Labour-led administrations and four in 
five councils which were under No Overall Control, or were controlled by either the Liberal 




3 For 22 cases we have no data on changes to the scheme budget.  
      Total          151      100.00
                                                
        yes          125       82.78      100.00
         no           26       17.22       17.22
                                                
      open?        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
     remain  
 LWA scheme  








Table 3. Does LWA scheme remain open by party of majority control  
 
When we focus on changes to the budget by party of control (see Figure 1), we observe that 
Conservative-led Councils are somewhat more likely to have made larger cuts to their schemes. 
Of the five Councils that have cut their LWA budgets by less than a quarter, three are led by 
Labour administrations (Slough, Islington, North Tyneside – the latter two increasing their budgets 
in this area) while two are Conservative administrations (Peterborough, Derbyshire). 
 
Figure 1. Reduction in LWA budget between 2013/14 and 2018/18 
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In Table 4 below, we begin to examine the effects of party of control, while adjusting for 
differences in the characteristics of the authorities in question – namely, in terms of the age 
dependency rate, the deprivation rate and the geography of the LAs in question. This matters 
because the party-of-government effect is in part obscured by the other variables of interest. For 
example, Labour-led Councils are substantially more likely to be more deprived than Conservative-
led councils. They also have substantially lower age dependency rates (mean values .32 vs .47).  
In Table 4 we model changes to LWA budgets between 2013/14 and 2018/19. In model 1, using 
all available cases for which we have scheme budget information, we observe that the average cut 
to LWA scheme budget was 4.5 percentage points lower for Labour-led Councils than those 
administered by the Conservatives. When we turn to the completed case analysis in Model 2, we 
find that the partisan effects elevate – to -7ppts in the case of Labour-led administrations, and -11 
percentage points in the case of Councils under No Overall Control, or led by the Liberal 
Democrats or by Independents. The 24 cases lost in moving between Models 1 and 2 are all County 
Councils, for whom we do not have demographic or economic information. In model 3 we see 
that age dependency is associated with lower LWA budget cuts, contrary to what we expect; our 
economic variables behave inconsistently – higher GVA is associated with lower LWA cutbacks 
(which we expect) but higher rates of deprivation as measured by the IMD is also associated with 
lower cutbacks (contrary to what we expect). The inclusion of these variables reduces the partisan 
effect to 5.1 percentage points. In model 4 we include a dummy for Councils in London and the 
South-East, where LWA budget cuts are more common than elsewhere. The inclusion of a 
London and South East dummy lowers the partisan effect to 2.8 percentage points; the age 
dependency rate now falls in the expected direction, with Councils with higher rates of age 
dependency more likely to impose LWA cuts. In model 5, we exclude five influential observations 
where values of Cook’s D exceed the traditional cutoff of 4/n.  This improves the model fit and 
changes the direction of the deprivation coefficient (with more deprived authorities more likely to 
cut back their LWA schemes, as expected). The exclusion of these influential observations leaves 
us with a model that estimates that the average cut for LWA budgets in Labour-led administrations 







Table 4. OLS regression on changes to LWA scheme budget 
 
Council Tax Support schemes  
The second type of scheme we consider here are Council Tax Support (CTS) schemes, data for 
which have been collated and kindly shared by the New Policy Institute. We know from the 
existing literature that the primary way that these schemes have been amended has been via the 
introduction of a minimum payment (as a percentage of a resident’s council tax liability). Figure 2 
below displays the distribution of minimum payments by local authority. This demonstrates that 
by 2018/19 fewer than 20 per cent of Councils did not impose a minimum payment. The most 
common option was to impose a minimum payment of 20% of the eligible payment, with a 
maximum payment of 50 per cent. In Figure A1 we present how the cumulative distribution of 
minimum payments have changed over time. From this we observe that most Councils imposed 
minimum payments at the earliest opportunity in 2013/14, and that these have progressively 




* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                    
R-squared                   0.013           0.028           0.062           0.107           0.126   
Observations                  129             105             105             105             100   
                                                                                                    
                          (22.40)         (17.74)          (5.10)          (3.74)          (3.35)   
Constant                    76.31***        78.76***        113.6***        90.43***        66.44** 
                                                                           (2.23)          (2.70)   
London & SE                                                                 14.30*          13.81** 
                                                          (-1.32)         (-0.74)          (0.53)   
Deprivation quinti~s                                       -3.238          -1.851           1.074   
                                                          (-1.71)         (-1.96)         (-0.02)   
Gross Value-Added                                          -0.595          -0.672        -0.00541   
                                                          (-0.85)          (0.39)          (0.56)   
Age Dependency Rate                                        -25.00           12.97           15.31   
                          (-1.19)         (-1.65)         (-1.54)         (-1.46)         (-1.92)   
NOC/Ind/Lib Dem            -7.229          -11.39          -11.16          -10.37          -10.95   
                          (-0.98)         (-1.29)         (-0.68)         (-0.37)         (-0.62)   
Labour                     -4.480          -6.929          -5.141          -2.782          -3.879   
                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   
                                                                                                    
DV: Percentage cutback in LWA budget
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Figure 2. Distribution of minimum payments (%) by local authority, 2018/19  
 
 
We find that 81% of Councils imposed minimum payments in 2018/19, up from 70% in 2013/14. 
When we look at the party-of-control effect (Table 5), we observe that there is a differential, with 
Conservative-led Councils more likely than those led by Labour, the Liberal Democrats or 
NOC/Independents to have imposed minimum payments.  
If we look at the distribution of minimum payments between Labour- and Conservative-led 
Councils (see Figure 3), we observe that this is reasonably similar: the median value for 
Conservative-led councils is somewhat higher than for those administered by Labour, but the 75th 
percentile value is lower. It is two Conservative-led councils who impose the highest minimum 
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Table 5. Whether councils imposed minimum payments in 2018/19, by party of 
government  
 
In Table 6 below, we present results from a set of linear regression models where the dependent 
variable is the value of the minimum payment imposed on residents in relation to their Council 
Tax (if any), as presented in Figure 2. We observe that, relative to the reference category of 
Conservative-led councils, Labour councils imposed minimum payments that were 0.9ppts lower, 
while the equivalent figures for those under NOC/Independent and Lib Dem Councils were -
2ppts and -8ppts, respectively. 
There is a negative association, contrary to our hypothesis, between age dependency rates and the 
minimum payment value imposed; controlling for age dependency elevates the coefficient for 
Labour-led administrations somewhat. In model 3 we observe that, in line with our hypothesis, 
higher levels of Gross Value-Added and lower rates of multiple deprivation are associated with 
lower minimum payments being imposed on residents. Including the economic variables into the 
model substantially increases the effect size for Labour-led councils – rising to -7.4 ppts. In Model 
4, we exclude 15 influential observations. This sharpens the effect the partisan effect for Labour-
led Councils to -8.9 percentage points. We find, then, most Councils have made changes to their 
CTS schemes by requiring minimum Council Tax payments even for low-income residents of 
working age. We observe a very modest partisan difference in terms of the minimum payments 
                         18.63      81.37      100.00 
             Total          60        262         322 
                                                     
                         29.27      70.73      100.00 
NOC or Independent          12         29          41 
                                                     
                         50.00      50.00      100.00 
 Liberal Democrats           6          6          12 
                                                     
                         19.79      80.21      100.00 
            Labour          19         77          96 
                                                     
                         13.29      86.71      100.00 
     Conservatives          23        150         173 
                                                     
        by Council          no        yes       Total
 Majority control,        minpay1819b
        Party with  
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imposed by Councils in our descriptive analysis but this partisan effect is considerably stronger 
when we control for characteristics of the Councils themselves. 
 























Table 6. Regression model (OLS) predicting minimum Council Tax Payment (2018/19)  
 
Discretionary Housing Payments 
The third payments of interest are Discretionary Housing Payments, which have become a central 
mechanism for Councils to partially offset the effects of welfare reform. Our measure here is the 
proportion of central government DHP allocations spent by local authorities, averaged over six years. 
The total (nominal) value of this central government allocation has fluctuated significantly between 
2013/14 and 2018/19, from £180m in 2013/14, falling to £125m in 2015/16, before rising to 
£153m in 2018/19, our primary year of interest.  
Over the six years, the median proportion of DHP allocation spent was 96%. A quarter of 
authorities spent less than 85% of their allocation, while one-in-twenty spent less than 70% of 
their allocation. In contrast one-in-ten councils spent more than 5% more than the allocation they 
received. Thus, while there is a significant degree of clustering around the 100% mark (see Figure 
4), there is also variation around it.  
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
R-squared                   0.027           0.033           0.153           0.191   
Observations                  322             322             322             307   
                                                                                    
                          (21.91)          (7.76)          (7.07)          (6.94)   
Constant                    16.02***        19.32***        31.45***        29.49***
                                                           (3.04)          (4.30)   
Deprivation deciles                                         0.784**         1.087***
                                                          (-4.50)         (-4.01)   
Gross Value-Added                                          -0.367***       -0.331***
                                          (-1.39)         (-3.70)         (-4.12)   
Age Dependency Rate                        -6.872          -20.16***       -20.88***
                          (-1.21)         (-1.31)         (-3.13)         (-3.32)   
NOC or Independent         -2.017          -2.196          -5.234**        -5.197** 
                          (-2.85)         (-2.99)         (-2.85)         (-2.37)   
Lib Dem                    -8.184**        -8.609**        -7.744**        -7.157*  
                          (-0.70)         (-1.31)         (-4.33)         (-5.40)   
Labour                     -0.851          -1.853          -7.383***       -8.887***
                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)   
                                                                                    
DV: Amount of minimum payment
20 
 
Table 7. Councils with the five lowest and highest spending on DHPs as proportion of 
allocation (2013/14-2018/19), and party of government  
 
In Table 7 we identify the local authorities spending the lowest and highest proportions of the 
DHP allocations on this purpose, alongside the party of control of these authorities. This 
demonstrates, at a descriptive level and for these most extreme cases only, the three councils 
spending the lowest proportion of their DHPs were Conservative councils, while three of the five 
authorities spending the highest proportions of their allocations were Labour-led Councils. 
More generally, the average Conservative-led council spends 91% of the contribution it receives, 
whereas Labour-led councils spend 100% of this. Moving beyond averages, we display the 
distribution in the boxplot below in Figure 4. What we find is that there is somewhat less variation 
in the behaviour of Labour-led councils than Conservative-led ones. For Labour-led councils, the 
interquartile range is very small indeed – just eight percentage points, with three-quarters of 
Labour-led councils spending in excess of 95% of their allocation.  
In Table 8 below, we see that in model one Labour-led councils spend 8.5ppts more of their 
allocations than Conservative-led administrations. Adding in the demographic variable (in model 
2), we find that higher age dependency ratios are associated with lower proportionate spending on 
DHP, as we predict. When we include the economic variables (model 3) we find that GVA per 
person is associated with higher proportions of DHP allocations being spent (as we expect) while 
multiple deprivation exerts a very modest negative effect on the proportion of DHP allocation 
spent. In model 4 we include the number of housing benefit claims per working-age adult in the 
local authority. This is positively associated with spending more on DHP, as we might anticipate. 
This leaves us with a partisan effect of 7.3 percentage points for Labour-led councils when 
compared to those led by the Conservative Party. Finally, in model 5 we exclude 18 influential 
observations. This serves to weaken the partisan effect to 4.5 percentage points. 
Unlike the two previous payments considered, where there have been substantial cutbacks to local-
level schemes, the most common response in relation to Discretionary Housing Payments has 
been to allocate all, or almost all, of the awards received from central government for this purpose. 
As we have argued earlier, this is perhaps understandable as DHPs are often used to ensure that 
low-income families can meet housing-related payments, and which may therefore prevent 
Authority DHP proportion Party of control 2018 Authority DHP proportion Party of control 2018
North Lincolnshire 0.2578779 Conservatives Stratford-on-Avon 1.71545 Conservatives
Epping Forest 0.3567996 Conservatives Gateshead 1.493881 Labour
Mansfield 0.4189192 NOC or Independent Greenwich 1.329313 Labour
Lichfield 0.4708031 Conservatives Runnymede 1.328283 Conservatives
North East Lincolnshire 0.4888859 NOC or Independent Liverpool 1.275487 Labour
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homelessness, which may in turn result in a charge on Council resources. Despite this overall 
tendency to make awards broadly in line with the amounts allocated, we observe that partisanship 
does appear to have a modest effect on the propensity to spend DHP allocations received from 
central government in full, even adjusting for differences in the characteristics of Councils. 
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Table 8. Regression (OLS) estimating the effects of party-of-government, demographics 
and economics on the proportion of DHP allocation spent  
 
Sensitivity analysis  
A series of tests of sensitivity have been explored. These include: (i) estimating ordinal logit models 
so as to relax assumptions regarding the normal distribution of the main dependent variables, (ii) 
using quantiles based on the income and employment components of the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation instead of the composite index, (iii) replacing party of control variable with a measure 
reflecting Labour’s seat share in each Council in 2018, (iv), using party of control data for 2013, 
and (v) controlling for claimant counts and regional differences. In each case we compare results 
to the full models presented above before influential observations have been removed and we 
discuss the primary differences here. 
For Local Welfare Assistance schemes models, we find that relying on the 2013 electoral makeup 
of councils lowers partisan effect for Labour-led councils to -2.3 percentage points (in comparison 
to -2.8 ppts in the main model, while reliance on income deprivation quintiles sharpens this to -
3.7ppts. One notable departure occurs if we replace LA party-of-control with Labour’s seat share. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                    
R-squared                   0.076           0.098           0.117           0.145           0.207   
Observations                  313             313             313             313             295   
                                                                                                    
                          (83.78)         (27.64)         (13.10)         (12.61)         (17.37)   
Constant                    0.911***        1.006***        0.912***        0.877***        0.907***
                                                                           (3.16)          (4.02)   
Housing Ben claims                                                          1.497**         1.476***
                                                          (-0.77)         (-3.06)         (-3.09)   
Deprivation deciles                                      -0.00310         -0.0217**       -0.0170** 
                                                           (2.01)          (1.42)          (0.85)   
Gross Value-Added                                         0.00257*        0.00182        0.000828   
                                          (-2.73)         (-1.25)         (-1.87)         (-3.26)   
Age Dependency Rate                        -0.198**        -0.105          -0.159          -0.207** 
                           (0.04)         (-0.18)          (0.42)          (0.38)          (0.08)   
NOC or Independent       0.000898        -0.00436          0.0109         0.00962         0.00154   
                          (-1.02)         (-1.32)         (-1.41)         (-1.76)         (-0.73)   
Lib Dem                   -0.0432         -0.0554         -0.0590         -0.0730         -0.0271   
                           (4.62)          (2.65)          (3.14)          (2.78)          (2.25)   
Labour                     0.0846***       0.0557**        0.0834**        0.0732**        0.0446*  
                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   
                                                                                                    
DV: Proportion of DHP allocation spent (six-year average)
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While in the descriptive analysis, councils with less than one-quarter Labour representation are 
associated with the highest LWA cutbacks (this category captures most of the Conservative-led 
councils), once controls were added in the regression model, councils with 50.1-75% Labour 
representation were associated the highest minimum payments. Thus, a party-of-control variable 
provides partially inconsistent results to a focus on Labour’s seat share (for this scheme only), 
perhaps suggesting that there are important differences within Labour-led councils that are not 
captured by the party-of-control variable. Finally, the effect of age deprivation is negligible if a full 
range of regional controls are added.   
In relation to Council Tax Support schemes, the partisan effects are found to be highly consistent 
across the sensitivity analysis we conduct. In addition, we re-run the analysis using a binary measure 
of whether a council has imposed a council tax band cap on eligibility. We continue to observe a 
partisan effect in relation to this, especially in relation to the comparison between Labour- and 
Conservative-led administrations.  
In relation to Discretionary Housing Payments, we find that the use of 2013 party data moderates 
the Labour effect to 6ppts and the income decile model to 6.6ppts (from 7.3ppts in the main 
model). Overall, then, the sensitivity analysis largely confirm our preceding findings, and, in doing 
so, provides confidence in the findings that we have reached. 
Discussion and conclusion  
The Welfare Reform Act of 2012 created a new localised system of social security payments across 
England. The Act abolished Council Tax Benefit and the Discretionary Social Fund, and tasked 
local authorities with designing local replacements to these schemes, with limited restrictions 
placed on them in terms of scheme design and with minimal requirements on them to report to 
central government about the replacement schemes that eventuated (if any). Allocations made to 
local authorities for Discretionary Housing Payments were significantly increased, with these 
payments given a new remit to mitigate the sharpest impacts of welfare reform. These new 
localised powers opened up the prospect of a new, localised social security terrain, but it is one 
that remains under-analysed empirically. In this paper, we have presented analysis of a newly-
constructed dataset examining provision in relation to these three payments jointly for the first 
time, providing empirical evidence on these important cases. 
We find that there have been substantial cuts in local social security provision in the period since 
the devolution of payments to LAs in England, leaving a patchwork of local welfare support. In 
relation to Local Welfare Assistance, we find that while most schemes remained open in 2018/19, 
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there have been very substantial cuts made to the budgets made to most schemes, with the 
overwhelming majority (80%) experiencing a budget cut of more than one-half. In relation to 
Council Tax Schemes, we find that more than 80% of Councils had imposed a minimum payment 
on working-age residents, and that these minimum payments have ratcheted upwards over time. 
The proportion of DHP allocations that Councils spend for this purpose have been more stable, 
which is perhaps understandable given their role in seeking to mitigate housing need, but the 
absolute amounts allocated by central government has declined. Thus, while  
schemes have typically not been abandoned altogether, there have been substantial cutbacks to 
their budgets, reflecting the cuts imposed by central government. Considerable variation now 
exists in terms of provision across England. The localisation of these schemes has proved to be a 
rather successful mechanism for implementing austerity.  
We have also sought to explore whether differences in the political makeup of elected councils 
helps to explain variation in local welfare provision. Our analysis has drawn on political, 
demographic and economic hypotheses. In relation to political partisanship, we find that 
Conservative-led Councils have been more likely to cut back on all three payments than those led 
by the Labour Party, even after we control for local authority differences in terms of demographic 
and economic profiles. These partisan effects are evident for two of the three schemes in the 
univariate analysis (i.e. model 1 in Tables 4, 6 and 8; the effect in relation to Council Tax Benefit 
is very modest), and they are evident for all three schemes after we control for local authority 
characteristics and adjust for influential observations. Thus, within what is a very restricted climate, 
the evidence suggests that partisan politics at a local level continued to play a role in terms of the 
subsequent policies that emerged.  
The demographic variable was in line with our hypothesis for two of the three payments. Higher 
age dependency ratios were associated with Councils making larger cuts to their Local Welfare 
Assistance scheme budgets and spending lower proportions of their DHP awards for that purpose. 
Local authorities with higher age dependency rates were associated with the imposition of lower 
minimum payments as part of their Council Tax Support schemes, which is contrary to our 
hypothesis. These outcomes provide a reasonable level of support for our demographic 
hypothesis.  
The economic hypothesis received greater support. More deprived local authorities were: 
associated with larger cuts to the budgets of their Local Welfare Assistance schemes and imposed 
greater minimum payments in respect of their Council Tax Support schemes (consistent with our 
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hypothesis) but were no more or less likely to spend their DHP allocations in full than less deprived 
authorities.  
There has been a substantial degree of retrenchment in the three schemes examined here since the 
Welfare Reform Act of 2012 and the policy landscape in relation to this provision across England 
is now highly variable. The cuts made to these schemes, which are often relied upon by citizens 
on the lowest of incomes, have been harsh but are consistent with what we might expect given the 
emphasis on fiscal consolidation as an over-arching policy priority of central government, and with 
the substantial degree of cuts made to local government funding. But despite this harsh financial 
climate, it has remained possible to make different choices, and we have observed how local social 
security provision varies in important ways by the political makeup of local government and by 
the demographic and economic challenges faced by local government administrations. Politics 
remains possible even in the harshest of policy environments. 
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